Abstract: This is the enlarged version of an English article published before. It analyzes 43 works of the new Chinese Mao literature from the early 1990s, their revelations of Party history and their clues for the self-image of the present leadership. Besides revealing a wealth of new information on Chinese domestic and foreign policy, in particular on the campaigns of the Mao era like the Great Leap and the Cultural Revolution, the works convey important insights into China's political culture. In spite of the overt attempts at forging a unified national identity and historiography, they also document the existence of independent, critical thought in China.
propaganda. Its propaganda apparatus has been gearing up for Mao' s 100th anniversary during recent years. It revived the occupation with Mao that had abated after the early 1980s. While openly restorative tendencies emerged after the crush of the Tiananmen demonstrations of 1989, the internal resistance against the resurrection of left-wing ideology became equally conspicuous later on.
Spontaneous social developments and deliberate political decisions have thus combined to create a huge corpus of new Mao-literature. The resulting volume of publications defies calculation, but rough estimates put the number of monographs at more than 100, plus innumerable articles published in historical and political journals, new editions of Mao' s writings, a great number of treatises expounding his theoretical contributions, and many internally published memoirs. 1 The 43 books under review here cannot claim to exhaust the subject. Nevertheless, this collection is indicative of the new trend. It includes serious historical work which fills many blanks in Party history or provides fascinating glimpses into the political process at Zhongnanhai, and also books which degenerate into hagiographic gossip and popular myth. All the books show the still remaining taboos of political discourse and new attempts at rewriting history, but they also confirm the extent to which opinion undermining such attempts persists.
Besides grappling with the daunting size of this new literature, the scholar is confronted with a major difficulty in using such materials: documentation and citation are not up to Western standards -if present at all. In some instances new information and leaked internal documents can be checked against other reliable sources, but mostly the reader is left with the decision to believe or disbelieve. Mao biographers of long standing like Li Rui or former members of the Chairman's personal entourage should vouch for a certain authenticity, even if the danger of censoring is always there. But what about unattributed information in the works of unknown authors or circular citation without giving credit? Works published in large editions by the Central Party School or the People' s Press can certainly claim to represent (parts of) current official thinking. In contrast, small publishers with more limited editions seem to concentrate on plagiarizing -but they can be just as effective at smuggling in controversial information not deemed to be ready for mass-circulation. These caveats should be borne in mind in considering the following comments on the sample of books under discussion.
Genealogies
The first group of works, a further tribute to traditional scholarship, are meticulously compiled family histories. The most elaborate example is Li Xiangwen' s history of the Mao family which covers 61 people in the Mao clan and the 1 For a fairly large but still incomplete bibliography confer: Wang Jin (ed.), Mao Zedong da cidian (A Great Dictionary Concerning Mao Tse-tung) It includes the enterprising and profiteering abilities of Mao' s father, a subject once neglected but now taken up by the official press which praises him as a model rich peasant, "knowledgeable in how to make a fortune". 3 Mao is preferably pictured as an obedient son whose untiring diligence is eventually acknowledged by the strict father. Devouring his books at the border of the fields and late at night under the dim light of an oil lamp, he prepares for the wide world. Descriptions as such testify to the power of traditional role models and ideals of learning. They can totally overgrow Mao's own much more rebellious account of his childhood as he told it to Edgar Snow in 1936. 4 For the first time, the history of Mao' s ten children, among them seven who died early in infancy or were lost during the wars, is recounted in detail. We learn of Mao' s three oldest sons, pre-school boys entrusted to the Communist underground of Shanghai in the late 1920s where they were finally reduced to roaming the streets and begging for a living. The two surviving ones were later conducted to the Soviet Union, where they studied until the late 1940s.
One of them, Mao's oldest son Mao Anying, fell in the Korean War 1950, the second one, the still surviving Mao Anqing, suffered from constant fits of mental derangement due to his experiences in early childhood. Until his retirement in the 1980s he worked in the Translation Bureau for Marxist-Leninist Classics under the Central Committee's Propaganda Department. Mao's last wife Jiang Qing gave birth to only one child: Mao's daughter Li Na, who played a role during the Cultural Revolution and later worked in the Central Committee's General Office.
Six children by Mao' s second wife He Zizhen either died or were handed over to peasants; only his daughter Li Min, who later worked for army offices, survived. These children attest to the ordeal of the Long March and Mao' s role as a Great Procreator and Great Abandoner.
He Zizhen, who dictated her memoirs shortly before her death in 1984, is testifying to this uncanny characteristic again when she recalls her curtailed re-encounter with Mao on Mount Lushan in July 1959 after a separation and retirement of 22 years that was forced on her.
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And so do Mao Anqing, Li Min and Li Na, Mao' s surviving children who enjoyed only sporadic access to him during his later life. 6 Although the theme of abandonment is not mentioned in the accolades about the pious son, the thoughtful husband, the impartial father disinclined to family patronage, it is lurking between the lines. Among the members of Mao' s family it is Jiang Qing who has wielded the greatest political influence. Because of her involvement in the Cultural Revolution her treatment in the literature is particularly sensitive. The new books therefore either ignore her completely or seem to stick to some unpublished internal material when telling her story.
In any case, it is striking that another genealogy published one year before Li Xiangwen' s volume produces exactly the same text on Mao' s third wife. In contrast, Mao's relations to the host of wider relatives, former neighbors and friends from his native Shaoshan receive extensive treatment. In the 1950s they make pilgrimages to Beijing in order to admire their fellow villager in his new home on the imperial palace grounds.
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These visits cannot have been pure joy for Mao, for after the exchange of reminiscences and information the conversation unfailingly concentrates on one main concern: the request for patronage. Should we wish to believe the books, Mao seems to have been a friendly alms giver, an unwilling job broker and only a hesitating helper in political troubles. Asked by an embarrassed township administration to assist in the assignment of class status to his own family, he is supposed to have pleaded for their partial expropriation as rich peasants.
Mao the bibliophile
Loving care is given to the presentation of Mao the bibliophile. We now have another book by the prolific Li Rui, who details the reading matter of the young student Mao.
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There is nothing really new in the volume as it basically repeats the mixture of traditional works, popular novels, Yan These are eerie recollections about an old man suffering from constant geriatric ailments since 1971, dependent on tales from informants and documents read aloud, reduced to mumbling and scribbling hardly intelligible Supreme Instructions, driven incognito to a car park at Wangfujing in order to risk a last silent glance at city life from behind the sedan' s curtain. Access to Mao was tightly controlled, as he was effectively secluded from even most Politburo members.
With mistrust and skepticism taking hold of him more and more, he was increasingly withdrawing to an inner world peopled by the archetypes of the Peking opera and classical literature. In essence, the book is a tribute to Liang rather than an eulogy to Mao. It offers the full background to the clash between the two equally obstinate men, acclaims Liang' s opposition to the Cultural Revolution and records his steadfast refusal to accept class struggle as the key to all historical progress.
Mao and the Soviet Union
One of the few books on Mao with foreign policy implications has been published by the Central Party School. 
Mao and XXX
In addition to the above sources there is a whole class of secondary literature with endless variations on the theme "Mao Zedong and xxx", making use of memoirs published elsewhere. Among the better ones is a volume on 46 of his personal acquaintances in Party, educational, intellectual, united front and foreign visitor circles. In one instance, episodes from memorial literature are brought together to produce a rambling private biography.
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Often these compilations touch briefly upon the fate of Mao' s erstwhile colleagues during the Cultural Revolution.
The general tendency is for an expurgated version, leaving out the cruel facts and craving for some ultimate reconciliation with a well-intentioned but erring Chairman -if not in life, then in ideal. Nowhere do the accounts reach the gruesome density of earlier personal recollections by the victims of the Cultural Revolution which were produced in the political thaw of the mid-1980s. There is an inadvertent element of humor in such scenes. But is it humorous to read about Mao' s acquaintance Wu Han who also misunderstood the Hai Rui ruminations of the Great Helmsman and whose ensuing suicide in 1967 is just faintly hinted at? 37 -His wife followed him to death, his imprisoned daughter became insane. And how are we to react to former classmate and biographer Xiao San who took proletarian internationalism too literally by marrying a German and cultivating Russian friends? He is on the record as a great friend of Mao -with either just a few sentences on his imprisonment as a spy during the last decade of the Chairman' s life or no word on that subject at all. It is well-known that it has always been an ambiguous love-hate relationship on Mao's part. In detached, cool and emotionless language the two volumes record just how difficult it has been -thereby leaving an even greater impression. Elders of more than 70 years are sent for re-education to the countryside where they have to herd cattle or clean the latrines. Defendants get their arms stretched into the "jet-plane position" during their interrogations before "people's tribunals" or are kicked back and forth between their torturers. More than half of Mao's acquaintances are condemned to forced labor or years of imprisonment. But even if he learns of such tribulations, Another exception to the usual conventions is a book which -although almost hidden by its publication via Guizhou Nationalities Press -is definitely one of the most important work under review here. Making use of authentic memoirs, minutes, self-examinations and other first-hand materials, it outlines the experiences of four of the men who acted as officially endorsed major secretaries for Mao: Tian Jiaying (1948-66) , Li Rui (1958 -59), Zhou Xiaozhou (1936 -38) and Chen Boda (1939 . Ibid, [196] [197] [198] [199] [200] [201] [238] [239] [240] [241] Zhou Enlai: Putting losses first was done intentionally. Realism and discouragement are two things.
Peng Dehuai: After 10.7 million tons the heads became heated. He [Mao Zedong] is also responsible for this. But the main line cannot vacillate. Moreover, he cooled down relatively early, already in October [1958] . Why did I send this letter to the Chairman? I had the feeling that the Communist Party does not dare to allow criticism. If you write something down, every word must be balanced. I really could not bear this any longer.
Zhou Enlai: The Chairman has said, in the main it [the letter] is good, but its direction is not quite correct. Of course, he did not mention names. But beware, there is nothing great here. You still have not reached the stage of "anti-adventurism", but there is such a tendency. It is only a problem of cognition until now, only this. Such a criticism is also beneficial.
Peng Dehuai: It violates basic principles of the Party, if no criticism can be voiced in the Communist Party ! Zhou Enlai: The targets for steel, iron, coal cannot be fulfilled. Quite tight. Transportation is a big problem, too. Timber, fertilizer, grain continue to be scarce. Capital construction is even more important. And then machines, budget, finances, foreign trade… Shanghai coal reserves are down to only seven days. Grain reserves stood at only 15.5 million tons in June. The population increased by 20.8 million last year. Judging from our experiences from the First Five-Year Plan, the relationship between money and material value should amount to 1 : 9.6 Yuan. In 1956 we had reached 1 : 8.8. Things became critical at that time.
Peng Dehuai: Why do we never talk about these things at the conference? Zhou Enlai: We first talked about these difficulties, like on a meeting for remembering past bitterness. It is not good, if this is misunderstood and leads to discouragement.
Peng Dehuai: You know people just too well, always cunning and wily.
Zhou Enlai: That's a method. Didn't I commit the mistake to oppose adventurism in 1956? At that time I made big words and was ill-prepared. I spoke out at the second CC plenum. You have to be careful and learn your lesson. This time you stepped in for me. But in view of my experience you even wrote that the general line has been mainly correct. You didn't use the word "adventurism". But I made statements in both directions. 43 However, three days after this dialogue the tone of criticism changes and a merciless witch-hunt starts against the persons who had dared to openly blame the Chairman for the Great Leap debacle and who had commented his diatribes against the inner-Party opposition with the remark "Like in Stalin's later years!". Meticulous minutes are produced. We thus learn that the speech of Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Wentian with critical statements on Mao was 8,000 characters long -but only 270 characters dealt with the achievements of the Great Leap, while the word "but" was used 39 times, the word "imbalance" 13 times, the words "bottleneck of production" 12 times, and the words "big losses" 108 times. In all these cases the power of definition plays a crucial role. It is the Chairman who passes the judgment on sufficiency or insufficiency, and it is him who single-handedly decides the direction and scope of criticism. With his remark "We do not only debate problems but persons!" he unleashes attacks against opposition activities that, according to him, had been organized and planned long in advance. His order brings all attempts to treat the Peng Dehuai case as "a problem of cognition" to an end. In the Cultural Revolution it effectively amounts to a death verdict for Peng Dehuai. Mao played the same role as supreme judge in 1953 when he answered the carefully thought-out question whether Liang Shuming suffered from ideological or political problems. His answer "ideological problems", uttered after long hesitation before a breathless audience, spared the philosopher the worst. Ibid., Wang Donglin, Liang Shuming and Mao Zedong, p. 34. 48 Sun Qin 'an and Li Shizhen (ed.), Mao Zedong and Famous Personages, Even in old age Mao continued to be feared for his outbursts of anger. In August 1970 he demonstrated the same ability to turn the tables on inner-Party opposition on Mount Lushan, where he suddenly claimed decades-long differences with his aghast secretary Chen Boda. This conference, the Politburo meeting preceding it and the Byzantine intrigues concerning the office of state presidency are also covered meticulously.
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The more Mao refuses the position of state president ("I am a good director, not an actor!"), the more Lin Biao insists on a re-appointment to this office that had become vacant after the purge of Liu Shaoqi. Speculations focus on the likelihood that under the circumstances it will automatically fall to Mao's deputy. But the more Lin Biao clings to his position, the more determined Mao becomes to abolish the office and to counter the plans of his "closest comrade-in-arms" who threatens to become too powerful. As a counter-move the Lin Biao camp pushes the glorification of the "ingenious, creative" contributions of the Chairman to ever new heights. It starts zealous attacks on "counterrevolutionary elements who will leap up for joy, if they hear that Chairman Mao will not become state Tours, [194] [195] [196] [197] [198] [209] [210] [211] [212] [289] [290] [291] [292] [293] [294] [295] [296] [297] [298] [299] [300] [301] [302] [303] Xiao Xinli (ed.) The inspector must have wavered in his evaluation of tour impressions. In addition to his usual infatuation with the creative powers of the masses, the literature also records the following excerpt from Mao's conversation with one of his bodyguards: "I worry. They hide many things from me. They can make preparations wherever I arrive. You should go down! You can see the true situation and report to me…" 57 A Chinese publication has even less illusions when it describes the inspection syndrome, in particular after 1959:
We can imagine that Mao Zedong's personal inspections of provinces, prefectures and counties at that time were different from his former investigations of the Hunan peasant movement or of land reform in Xingguo. What he could see on the spot were the ideal, successful points, the glorious side. As grass-root cadres, the lower-level cadres of provinces, prefectures and counties held an attitude handed down by Chinese culture: you report your successes to your superior and not your difficulties. Who among them would have shown Mao Zedong the dark, unfavorable or problematic aspects of his work? Who would have reported to him his defeats, mistakes or contradictions with the center? … Whenever reports on difficulties showed up, Mao Zedong immediately took them to mean criticism of himself. In this way, an intense atmosphere of struggle took hold of the whole Party. The character of problems gradually changed, people who held different views in front of Mao Zedong became persons who were bought, seduced, corrupted or influenced by the class enemies (including bourgeoisie, imperialism and revisionism), weak figures succumbing to the sugar-coated bullets. and Mao's internal statements on the eve of the Great Leap remain largely taboo. They seem to be embarrassing to some Party leaders who were carried away by Mao's rhetoric at that time.
Only hints are dropped in regard to the Chairman's prophesies that shook the mind of many a leader: the impending fall of the family institution, the industrialization of the country within five to seven years and the soon arrival of communist society, the abolishment of salaries and monetary payments and the transition to natural supplies, further forced expropriations on the way to the People's Commune of China.
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The literature therefore presents the familiar picture of a mosaic that has to be pieced together from fragments. Nevertheless, some gems are revealed. One of these is the report on the Red Guard trial of former Foreign Affairs Minister Chen Yi. In the course of repeated mass interrogations Marshal Chen has been reduced to a thin shadow of his former corpulent and witty self. But Zhou Most Chinese studies want to preserve positive memories of the Chairman. Their stance reflects the very traditional assumption that stability and power rest on unity in publicly proclaimed thought and strength in autocratic leadership. Not surprisingly, this belief is expressed by another Chinese autocrat. Yet the unresolved issues of the literature signal an unresolved conflict between yearning for a strong man and aching under him, a conflict, which transforms into the tensions between compliance and defiance in Chinese politics and in its twin -Chinese historiography.
Coping with problems by resorting to hero worship, trivialization and suppression of deviant thought seems to be a ready solution for many difficulties, those of past interpretation as well as those of present policy. But in this browsing of the new Mao-literature we have also strolled across different chambers and corners of China's memory.
While politics still enter it with much noise through the front door, history quietly slips in through the back door.
